T his essay examines the revolutionary path of modern state formation in Vietnam under the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) since . It builds on scholarship produced in the last two decades that has emphasized Vietnamese agency and the radical character of the Vietnamese revolution.  Earlier scholarship portrayed this revolution as primarily patriotic and anticolonial in its goals, which were repeatedly frustrated by foreign intervention.  In contrast, an emerging perspective posits that communist ideology played the central role in the origin and development of the revolution.  Thanks to the new scholarship, it is now possible to treat Vietnamese communists not as nationalists in disguise, but as genuine radicals who aspired to construct a new order based on their revolutionary vision. This vision gave the VCP an ambitious three-fold mission: to achieve national independence, to build a socialist paradise, and to contribute to world revolution. The mission sounded noble, but opposition and resistance to it were also predictable from nearly every sector of society, including landlords and rich farmers who would later oppose land reform, merchants who would prefer a capitalist system, many intellectuals who would oppose Stalinist thought-control, and small farmers who would question the economic
rationale of Maoist-style collectivization. The communist mission also set the VCP on a collision course with nearly all the major world powers (France, Britain, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan) that ruled various parts of the world prior to .
This paper seeks to find out how, given their mission, Vietnamese communists navigated domestic and international politics to build a modern state. I argue that their radical ideology and practices shaped the path of state formation by creating particular opportunities and conundrums in five key aspects of state formation: legitimization, establishing sovereignty, territorialization, creating a centralized bureaucracy, and monopolizing violence.
In a world of nation-states, the party embraced class as the foundation of its legitimacy. Class-based ideology offered the party opportunities for mass mobilization and for gaining support from other revolutionary states. At the same time, the new state needed international recognition, while the mission of the party implied a rejection of the status quo world order dominated by the West. The concept of sovereignty in the Westphalian system was based on exclusive national territories, but the party's concept of internationalist solidarities compromised its view of national territory. This problem was exacerbated by the party's disrespect for international laws and institutions that were part of the world order it opposed.
Radicalism also created dilemmas as well as opportunities in building a centralized bureaucracy and coercive apparatuses. The need to create an efficient modern state bureaucracy and a professional military conflicted with the need to ensure that bureaucrats and soldiers were loyal to the revolutionary mission. Because they believed in the importance of class struggle and revolutionary justice, party leaders justified the use of mass violence, terrorism, and other criminal tactics. The Vietnamese revolution succeeded in defeating its class enemies, in challenging French and American imperialism, and in projecting Vietnam's power across Southeast Asia. Yet, the revolutionary ship ran aground in the late s with the collapse of world communism and the death or retirement of founding party leaders. Today the party has abandoned the Stalinist model of socialist development but still proclaims its loyalty to Marxism-Leninism. The revolutionary state left significant and adverse legacies that Vietnam is still grappling with today. These legacies are creating problems for Vietnam in its conflict with China in the South China Sea; in its efforts to reform the state bureaucracy to promote economic growth; and in controlling the state's coercive apparatuses, which now wield enormous power but whose corrupt and brutal practices can provoke mass unrest and threaten the regime's survival.
Vietnamese revolutionary state formation is significant beyond Vietnam.
In comparative perspective, state formation in Vietnam was a highly purposeful endeavor spanning four decades and led by a small group of revolutionary elites. These elites not only aspired to construct a viable state but also had a particular design for it. The intense purposefulness found in
Vietnamese state formation (and in other cases of modern revolutionary state formation in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Iran) makes this case stand out, especially in contrast to state formation under the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) as well as in much of Latin America and Africa, where postcolonial elites merely sought state power but not much else.
As a revolutionary state, the Vietnamese experience contributes to scholarship on revolutions and their role in world politics. The voluminous literature on revolutions has neglected ideology and has privileged such factors as class, state structure, and economic and political crises.  Although scholars agree that revolutions have great impact on world politics, the literature on the topic is thin.  Some authors argue that the birth of a revolutionary state likely triggers interstate wars or long-term tension in world politics as the revolutionary state flouts international norms and challenges the global order.  Others contend that systemic pressure and other mechanisms would gradually integrate revolutionary states into the existing world order.  As I hope to show, Vietnamese revolutionaries were capable of navigating world politics while maintaining their long-term revolutionary vision. The first section of this essay will analyze the dilemmas that revolutionary leaders face as they start to establish a state. The latter part will review historical events to show how Vietnamese leaders coped with such dilemmas in five key aspects of state formation.
Dilemmas for revolutionary states
Scholars of the modern state define it as a human community governed by a centralized bureaucracy with sole external and internal sovereignty within
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a given territory.  In this definition, the modern state encompasses both international and domestic dimensions. It is a unit in the state system that first emerged in Western Europe with the  Treaty of Westphalia. Its external sovereignty is conferred by other states in that system.  The system may be characterized as "anarchic" for lack of a world government, but it does have a structure shaped by a hierarchy of states with varying power endowments, and by the numerous rules and institutions constructed over time since Westphalia. The structure of the state system has continued to evolve, but the system has generally been dominated by the West. As a unit in the state system, the modern state also governs a domestic realm. Governance ideally requires a centralized bureaucracy to administer territory and extract resources from society to pay for government operations. Administration and resource extraction in turn require internal sovereignty, which comes from societal acceptance of state legitimacy and from the state's ability to maintain the monopoly of force. Since the French Revolution, the most common form of legitimization is appeal to an abstract nation defined by shared ethnicity or culture. The monopoly of violence is conducted through a standing military that pledges allegiance to the nation-state.
There are theoretical reasons to think that revolutionary state formation has distinctive features that distinguish it from the normal path. Revolutionary leaders build their state not only to secure their power but also for carrying out revolutionary goals. These goals vary, but they are not modest. Revolutionaries from the Bolsheviks to Islamists have sought not only to overthrow oppressive and corrupt domestic political systems, but also to subvert the global order dominated by capitalist/secular Western powers, either through their own efforts or in concert with other radical groups.  Such domestic and internationalist revolutionary missions naturally set them up for conflicts both with the West and with domestic reactionary classes or groups.
Yet revolutionary states' relations with the West need not be antagonistic. to accept watering down their radical visions and delaying their progressive programs. Also, those programs can be seen as offering opportunities for mobilizing the lower strata of the population.
The construction of a centralized bureaucracy also presents revolutionaries with both opportunities and challenges. Revolutionary leaders can build on the bureaucracy left behind by the old regime. In colonized countries, the colonial bureaucracy has many limitations but is nonetheless an organization with many modern elements. Yet the politically reactionary, socially elitist, and culturally racist colonial institutions represent all the things that revolutionaries fight against. Another dilemma is embodied in the notion of a "revolutionary bureaucracy," an apparent contradiction in terms. Modern Weberian bureaucracies are hierarchical organizations based primarily on RE VO LUT IO NA RY P AT H T O ST ATE FORM ATI ON standardized rules of operation and merit-or performance-based incentives.
They are therefore not conducive to the business of leading revolutionary change that promotes egalitarian values and that requires from each bureaucrat great personal sacrifice and unreserved loyalty to revolutionary ideals. Creating an effective bureaucracy is difficult enough. Creating an effective revolutionary bureaucracy that simultaneously administers mundane affairs of the state and oversees campaigns of class struggle or social reform is doubly difficult.
Revolutionary state-builders encounter opportunities as well as challenges as they seek to monopolize violence. They may not relish violence, but do not try to avoid it either. Except for the most radical among them who romanticize violence, most perhaps view violence simply as a tool to accomplish revolutionary goals. As a tool, revolutionary violence poses two dilemmas. First, revolutionaries everywhere glorify martyrdom and uphold the revolutionary spirit as the guiding force. At the same time, revolutionary states need modern armies with sophisticated weapons if they are to defend themselves or attack their enemies successfully. The dilemma is how to achieve a balance between technology and the revolutionary spirit. Second, revolutionary violence is infused with ideological concepts such as "jihad" for Islamists and "class struggle" for communists. Violence is also legitimized by revolutionary justice, which stands above secular or "class-based" laws. This concept of justice rationalizes (i.e., opens up opportunities for revolutionaries to deploy) a wide range of violent means. In particular, tactics such as terrorism and assassinations, which violate "bourgeois" or "infidel" laws, are within the bounds of revolutionary justice.
The missions and practices of revolutionary parties create particular dilemmas for state building. Next, we will examine Vietnam's revolutionary path to state formation. Throughout their struggle, Vietnamese revolutionaries managed to seize opportunities without wavering in their radical commitments. This tactical flexibility perhaps contributed to their success, but it did not come without a price.
Legitimization
Founded in , the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) sought to carry out a proletarian revolution in French Indochina. In the political manifesto drafted by its first general secretary, this revolution was projected to go through two phases.  The first phase was a "national bourgeois revolution" to overthrow colonial rule and landlord power, while the second phase was to create a socialist system modeled after the Soviet Union with public ownership of property, collective farming, and nationalized industry. Party leaders viewed their revolution as a component of world revolution and submitted their party to the leadership of the Moscow-based Third Communist International (Comintern).
ICP leaders defined the nation based on shared class interests as well as on shared ethnicity. For example, they viewed fellow Vietnamese of exploitative classes as a small minority in the Vietnamese national community.
These classes did not represent the nation and ought to be eliminated even though they were ethnically Vietnamese. At the same time, French workers were French nationals but their interests were identical with the Vietnamese nation rather than with French colonialists and imperialists. To Vietnamese communists, those who saw only the French-Vietnamese division but not the cross-national solidarity between French and Vietnamese working classes fell victim to a form of nationalism that was "bourgeois," "nar- That opportunistic move soon came back to haunt some party leaders.
The party had taken power, but its programs to aid peasants and workers were delayed for the sake of national unity. In , when the Cold War began in
Europe and the civil war in China turned to favor Chinese communists, the party seized the new opportunity to launch class mobilization even though it continued to appeal for national solidarity.  The new mode of legitimization was embodied in the land reform campaign during -, which was essentially a rural class struggle. This campaign certainly raised rural support for the party throughout Vietnam and may have contributed to the Việt Minh's victory against French forces at Điện Biên Phủ. The terror unleashed against the rural elites caused a large number to migrate from North to South
Vietnam after the Geneva Agreements in .  During -, legitimization continued to be based on both national and class commitments, but after , class commitments were again pushed to the fore.  Radical policies implemented in South Vietnam in the late s, from "capitalist reform" to rural collectivization, from cruel revenge against officials and supporters of the Sài Gòn regime to campaigns against the "imperialist cultural poisons," antagonized millions of South Vietnamese. These policies again spurred an exodus of two million boat people who braved death to leave Vietnam. The revolution ended long ago, but it has been difficult for the party to drop Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of the state. As a result, national interests are still defined within the confines of twentieth-century socialism.
This inability to part with the outdated revolutionary ideology is creating an acute legitimacy crisis. Socialism fails to legitimize the state in the minds of today's Vietnamese youth.  The ideological yoke on nationhood also compels the party to remain close to China, a fellow socialist state, despite rising anti-China sentiments among Vietnamese. In the last few years alone, the party may have squandered all its nationalist credentials, hard won over decades of war under the banner of national salvation.  As the legitimacy deficit grows, the state must rely more on coercion to maintain its rule.
Moreover, past policies of class-based mobilization have left deep scars for diasporic Vietnamese. Many northerners who migrated south in - and those who fled Vietnam in the s and s had been targets of class struggle and, as a result, lost everything they had. Ongoing hostilities between the Vietnamese state and overseas Vietnamese communities attest to the lasting legacies of the Vietnamese revolution.
Establishing Sovereignty
Sovereignty also presented opportunities and obstacles. The party needed both external and domestic sovereignty; yet the threats to each were dealt with differently at different times, suggesting opportunistic behavior. At the same time, as seen below, threats to state sovereignty to a large extent came from the ambitious mission of the party to carry out social revolution and to contribute to world revolution. Not until the revolution ran out of steam in the late s did the Vietnamese state achieve full external sovereignty. The threat from diasporic communities persists, however. The issue of colonialism had helped the party come to power in late . In the South, British occupation forces assisted the French in retaking control of that region.  There, the DRV struggled to maintain some presence but had no sovereignty to speak of. In northern and central Vietnam, the occupation forces of Nationalist China that had arrived to disarm the Japanese posed a serious threat as they brought with them anticommunist Vietnamese groups. These groups had significant popular support and controlled a sizable militia that challenged the domestic sovereignty of the DRV state.  As soon as Chinese troops were replaced by French forces under an agreement also signed by Hồ Chí Minh, his government used all its power to suppress anticommunist groups.
The DRV then waged a war against French occupation forces in December  to settle, by force, the question of Vietnam's sovereignty. In the first two years of the war, Hồ Chí Minh's government enjoyed domestic sovereignty in the areas under its control in northern and central Vietnam. In the Mekong Delta, it was only one among several Vietnamese groups that vied for control while fighting the French.  By late , changes in world politics presented DRV leaders with the opportunity to win support from the Soviet bloc for their sovereign claims-at the risk of getting caught in the emerging conflict between the two superpowers.  Domestically, anticommunist groups resumed efforts to form a united front under former Emperor Bảo Đại, raising the possibility that they would again become a threat to the domestic sovereignty of the DRV.  Party leaders did all they could to win recognition from China and the Soviet Union, which they achieved in early .  But the United States and its allies immediately retaliated by offering recognition to the Bảo Đại government that was founded a year earlier. In this case, the DRV achieved only partial external sovereignty while turning the Bảo Đại government from a weak challenge to its domestic sovereignty into a vital one. Their loyalty to the mission of the revolution explained this risky move by Hồ Chí Minh and his comrades. Joining the Soviet bloc was a natural step to realize their revolutionary commitments and gain material support from other revolutionary states.
During the next two decades, the party waged a savage war to achieve sovereignty in the southern half of the country. Its victory in  immediately established domestic sovereignty, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was on its way to achieving full external sovereignty by , as the new Jimmy Carter administration offered to normalize relations with the SRV and dropped its opposition to Vietnam's membership in the United Nations.  The long struggle for sovereignty would have ended there, but revolutionary hubris prevented Vietnamese leaders from seizing the opportunity.  That hubris also prevented them from seeing new security threats emerging from China and Cambodia. Those threats mounted by , when American interest in normalizing relations with Vietnam was waning.
After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in  and successfully withstood a border war with China the following year, the threats to Vietnam's security became manageable. At the same time, Vietnam's external sovereignty shrank due to the embargo imposed on Vietnam by the United States, its allies, and many international organizations. Vietnam only regained full external sovereignty in the mid s as it mended relations with China and normalized relations with the West. By that time, the revolution had become history, and the VCP was no longer a revolutionary party, despite how it saw itself.
Nevertheless, in an important sense the struggle for Vietnam's sovereignty is not yet over. Many diasporic Vietnamese remain hostile to Hà Nội and organize protests that humiliate Vietnamese leaders whenever they travel abroad. These protests continue to pose a challenge to the SRV state's claim to sovereignty. This is currently a weak threat, but recent moves by Vietnamese leaders to counter it have generated a backlash.  The ability of overseas Vietnamese to lobby their host governments and use the links they have with dissident groups inside Vietnam suggest that the threat is both domestic and external.
Territorialization
Territorialization is a central component of state formation. Due to their beliefs and experience, Vietnamese revolutionaries had mixed feelings about this topic. A major issue that stirred much debate early on was the geopolitical scope of their revolution. Under colonial rule, Vietnam joined Laos and Cambodia to form French Indochina. By the s, as Chris Goscha argues, the Indochinese identity was being accepted by an increasing number of younger Vietnamese, including communists like Trường Chinh, while the term Vietnam itself was not as common as the old name Annam.  Given the existence of a single colonial state over all of Indochina, it made RE VO LUT IO NA RY P AT H T O ST ATE FORM ATI ON strategic sense for the ICP to plan a revolution for Indochina as a whole. In fact, the Comintern wanted Vietnamese communists to organize a movement for all of Indochina, not just for Vietnam. The Comintern favored a regional movement for strategic and political reasons, but also because they supported the principle of class solidarity across national boundaries.
Vietnamese communists' concept of territory was revealed not only through their muddled sense of national identity but also in their transnational organizing activities. Thanh Niên, the first Vietnamese communist Vietnamese revolutionaries considered their homeland a sacred territory, their extensive cross-border activities were based on a general disregard for the principle of exclusivity embedded in the concept of national territory.
Their disregard for territorial exclusivity contributed to the success of Vietnamese communist state-building. Before its rise to power, the ICP had developed extensive links with northern Thailand and southern China. Soon after its founding, the DRV was able to trade with and obtain weapons and funds from Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.  Southern China played the same role, helping the DRV to mobilize resources for its war with 
Creating a Centralized Bureaucracy
The relationship between the VCP and the state is typically framed in two ways. Officially the political system is frequently described as one in which "the party leads, the state manages, and the people are the masters."  This confusing official formula essentially means that political leadership by the party is conducted through state machinery and is based on popular sovereignty. The formula suggests both a division of roles between the party and the state and their common mission of serving the Vietnamese people. Scholars of Vietnamese politics have used the term "party-state" drawn from the field of communist studies.  This term focuses on the organization of the communist system as a whole rather than on the roles and mission of the party and the state. In all communist countries, the Communist party is intimately bound to the state through a nomenklatura system. In this system, all state positions except the lowest are reserved for party members appointed by the party. Within each state bureaucracy at most levels of government, and in all branches of government, is a party committee entrusted with controlling and guiding that state bureaucracy from inside.
Rather than distinguishing the different functions of the party and the state, the term "party-state" treats them as if they are inseparable. However, both "party-state" and the official concept obscure the tension between the two. Despite a high level of enmeshing between them, the party and the state must be considered two separate organizations. In fact, a double dilemma has existed for the party since it founded the DRV state: how to control the bureaucracy it is supposed to lead, and how to make that bureaucracy serve the revolutionary mission.
The ICP swept into power in August . under party control and committed to radical revolution-at least for the time being. The remaining issue was to guarantee an appropriate ratio of "reds" to "experts." Experts, subordinated to reds, were needed for technical tasks. The appointment of all bureaucratic chiefs was based primarily on the red criterion; family class backgrounds were assigned greater weight than technical skills in recruitment and promotion; reds were paired with experts as co-leaders of a bureaucratic unit; embedded party committees led state bureaucracies from within; and finally, revolutionary momentum was sustained through regular political campaigns such as "anti-individualism," "learning from Đại Phong," and "three-readinesses."  These campaigns were aimed not only at mobilizing mass support for state programs but also at disciplining and instilling loyalty in bureaucrats. These combined methods helped ensure a loyal bureaucracy but they incurred enormous financial costs by maintaining a bloated bureaucracy with many red bureaucrats appointed just for "politicking." The red bureaucrats' interference in administrative issues, and the loss of productivity due to political campaigns, also wasted money. Data on the size of the bureaucracy are sparse and inconsistent, but it appears that the party and mass organizations today employ about one-third (one hundred thousand) of the total officials and public employees at the national level (three hundred thousand).  Before the late s, the party encountered little problem recruiting a sufficient number of experts for the state bureaucracy. They had few alternatives outside the state sector. Non-state jobs were either manual or illegal. Since market reforms in the late s, experts who are not red can find jobs in the private sector (including foreign-invested enterprises). At the same time, the genuinely red are now fewer, and red becomes merely a label indicative of family connections. The bureaucracy is increasingly ineffective, and corruption more endemic.  The revolutionary mission of the party crucially shaped the development of the state bureaucracy in Vietnam. The party first relied on the colonial bureaucracy, but later launched a bloody purge to create a loyal bureaucracy. To control the state, the party created an oversized bureaucracy at enormous financial cost. In addition, the emphasis on loyalty has enabled family ties and money to penetrate and corrupt the state bureaucracy.
Monopolizing violence
Violence is central to the creation of the modern order, and by definition modern states distinguish themselves from other forms of organizations by monopolizing the legal use of violence within a given territory. The revolutionary state in Vietnam acquired its monopoly on violence through wars and conquests for more than thirty years, which was unusually long and brutal for a postcolonial state. The Vietnamese path was also distinct in that In the early s, the VCP was tempted to follow Soviet advice to prioritize professionalism over revolutionary spirit in the military.  A plan to increase the PAVN's professionalism was implemented, along with a decision to replace party committees and commissars with a single-commander system.  This experiment was short-lived, however. Party committee leadership was revived in , even while the single-commander system was retained. The commissar served as a deputy to the military commander, not his equal, as had been the case in the commissar system. In the s, as the party became obsessed with an American plot of "peaceful evolution,"  the commissar system was revived.  The revolution was long dead by then, but ideology continued to exert a strong influence on party thinking, which affected the organization of the military.  Not only did the Marxist-Leninist ideology complicate state-building in
Vietnam by linking it to the concept of revolutionary spirit, but it also offered special opportunities to state-builders by sanctioning certain violent tactics. Class struggle in communist doctrine, in particular, allowed mass violence involving a multitude of perpetrators and victims. Class struggle presented an opportunity for the revolutionary state to destroy its rivals and acquire control over territory. But, for every class struggle campaign, the party had to factor in the international and domestic balance of forces, the degree of resistance by class enemies, and revolutionary needs at particular points. The ultimate goal for past campaigns was to "eliminate" [tiêu diệt, xóa bỏ] enemy classes, but throughout its history the party has acted opportunistically without sacrificing the goal. Varying levels of violence, from mass killings to mass incarceration and mass exile, have been applied to maximize impacts while minimizing cost or risk.
For instance, during the land reform of the mid-s, tens of thousands of landlords and rich farmers were tortured and executed. Yet, the land reform
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and collectivization in southern Vietnam after  avoided such violence and relied mostly on coercive tactics such as isolation and intimidation.  In , the party did not carry out mass detention of those who had worked for the French, yet hundreds of thousands of southerners who had worked for the Sài Gòn regime were incarcerated in hard labor camps after , many for more than a decade. In the wake of an imminent conflict with China in -, the party sought to expel ethnic Chinese from the country. Wealthy and middle-class ethnic Chinese in the south were especially forced to pay up front to depart "semi-legally" [đi bán chính thức] on governmentcontracted rickety boats that would dump them on neighboring countries.
According to (likely incomplete) official data, , Chinese left in  boats in this program, which brought the government . tons of gold, $,, . million đồng,  cars, and , houses and residential units.  Besides the mass violence of class struggle, the revolutionary path to state formation in Vietnam relied on practices that were of a terrorist or criminal nature, such as assassination, extortion, weapons smuggling, money laundering, and the heroin trade. These practices were not the monopoly of the revolutionary regime but were nonetheless justified in the name of the revolutionary mission, and contributed decisively to state formation. These practices are well-documented and often retold with pride long afterward in official histories of the revolution. The assassination of opponents and other terrorist acts were common tactics even before the party seized power in .  Violence was deployed against prominent political rivals, leaders of anti-communist groups, and "conspirators" with the enemies. They were assassinated or captured and executed in public by communist agents. In the s, numerous local officials and political figures in the South Vietnamese government were assassinated.  Some were beheaded in front of their families by communist cadres.  Also, urban commando teams detonated bombs at public places, killing many innocent civilians in addition to the targeted enemy officials.  As a young revolutionary, Hồ Chí Minh railed against the French for profiting from the drug trade and for encouraging Vietnamese to become drug addicts.  But, during the anti-French resistance, his government condoned and managed a lucrative heroin trade between resistance zones and the French-controlled areas to earn money for the revolution.  Those criminal ties have served the state as well as entrepreneurial police commanders. In the s and s, many cases of organized crime involving the police were reported, but the most notorious case was the "Năm Cam affair" in Hồ Chí Minh City that implicated a Police General and many other high-ranking officers.  When Colonel Dương Tự Trọng orchestrated a scheme for his brother to flee abroad, he and his conspirators relied on the help of a seasoned criminal.  Vietnam's public security forces today form a state within the state. They were created and authorized to deploy tactics that can be characterized as terrorist and criminal to defeat enemies of the revolution. The party entrusted them with wide powers during the revolution. In the postrevolutionary era, they have retained those powers while degenerating into perhaps the most corrupt and brutal institution in Vietnam. This is a legacy of the revolution and a potential fuse for the future rise of public anger directed against the state.
Conclusion
The formation of the postcolonial state in Vietnam followed a revolutionary path, which was distinct from the path taken by most other states. On this path, Vietnamese state builders confronted distinct challenges and enjoyed special opportunities due to their commitment to an ambitious revolutionary mission. This mission required the state to legitimize its raison d'être in class terms, form bonds with other revolutionary states, and construct a revolutionary bureaucracy. The mission also freed state-builders from the Westphalian concept of territory and cited revolutionary justice to justify class violence.
The process of state-building was significantly shaped by the VCP's relentless pursuit of revolutionary goals despite domestic resistance and foreign intervention. State-building was not only a top-down process but involved important contributions by members of lower classes in prerevolutionary society. Although the revolutionary identity of the state allowed it to draw support from the international revolutionary network, that very identity also triggered massive domestic and foreign challenges to its sovereignty. In the process, territorialization was downplayed as revolutionaries practiced proletarian internationalism that was not limited by national borders. The process also displayed a persistent tension between the revolutionary spirit and modern technology; the former played an important role throughout.
By definition, revolution implies violent conflict, and it is clear that the revolutionary path to state formation was a conflict-ridden and violent one for
Vietnam. Vietnam appeared to experience much more violence than other postcolonial states, with three wars following one another and with millions of lives destroyed in the process. Foreign intervention obviously is to blame for initiating and prolonging wars, but much of the violence that took place was deliberate or necessary to implement the revolutionary mission.
Vietnam's revolutionary path suggests an important paradox in how revolutionary states' behavior affects their relationship with the world. On the one hand, Vietnamese state-builders strived to live up to their radical commitments, which contributed to protracted conflicts that involved some of the world's great powers as well as many regional states. On the other hand, the communist revolutionaries were forced to react to changing international conditions, and in fact often acted pragmatically and opportunistically while still being committed to the revolutionary mission. To the extent that the Vietnamese experience can be generalized, the paradox suggests that international conflicts and tensions involving revolutionary states may occur and even be protracted, but may not be inevitable under certain circumstances.
Modern Vietnamese history as a case of revolutionary state formation illuminates many issues currently threatening the communist regime's sur- 
